Trump’s Board of Peace Is a Smorgasbord of Private Equity, Contractors and Conflicts of Interest

Trump’s Gaza Board of Peace Faces Serious Questions Over Money, Private Contractors, Conflicts of Interest and Accountability

President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace was created with an extraordinary mandate: oversee Gaza’s transition from war, coordinate reconstruction, mobilize billions of dollars and help establish a new governing structure for more than two million Palestinians. But as the organization moves deeper into that mission, its unusual structure is generating increasingly serious questions about who controls its money, how contracts will be awarded, whether senior figures have financial interests connected to the same governments and industries affected by their diplomatic decisions, and what legal accountability would exist for officials and private security contractors operating under the Board.

A new investigation by More Perfect Union brings many of those controversies together, portraying the Board of Peace as an international reconstruction authority sitting at the intersection of diplomacy, private capital, real estate, foreign sovereign wealth and security contracting. Several of the investigation’s central concerns are supported by the Board’s charter, congressional inquiries, United Nations documents and independent reporting, although some of the report’s broader allegations remain contested or unproven.

That distinction is critical. The available public evidence raises substantial questions about potential conflicts of interest, concentrated authority and inadequate oversight. It does not currently establish that Board officials have criminally misappropriated Gaza reconstruction money, accepted bribes or illegally steered contracts for personal profit. The more defensible concern is structural: an organization entrusted with rebuilding one of the most devastated territories in the world has been designed in ways critics argue could create extraordinary opportunities for conflicts of interest, self-dealing and weak accountability.

The United Nations Gave the Board Extraordinary Authority Over Gaza

The Board of Peace did not emerge solely as an informal Trump administration project. In November 2025, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2803, endorsing Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict and welcoming the creation of the Board as a transitional authority that would establish the framework and coordinate financing for Gaza’s redevelopment.

The U.N. framework envisioned Gaza’s day to day civil administration being handled by a technocratic Palestinian committee while the Board exercised broader international oversight. It also authorized the establishment of an International Stabilization Force and connected the reconstruction process to an eventual transition toward Palestinian governance. That gave the organization enormous potential influence over Gaza’s political and economic future. Reconstruction is expected to require more than $70 billion over the coming decade, meaning decisions involving housing, infrastructure, utilities, transportation, security and investment could eventually produce contracts and economic opportunities worth tens of billions of dollars.

The Board’s charter subsequently revealed an even broader ambition. Although the organization originated through the Gaza peace process, the charter itself does not specifically limit the Board to Gaza. Instead, it describes an international organization intended to promote stability and governance in areas affected or threatened by conflict, potentially giving the institution a mission extending far beyond the Palestinian territory.

Trump Holds Extraordinary Personal Authority Over the Organization

Perhaps the most consequential feature of the Board is the amount of authority concentrated in its chairman. Trump is not merely the American representative sitting alongside other governments. The Board’s governing structure gives the chairman extensive authority over appointments, agendas, organizational structures and disputes.

An analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace found that the charter empowers Trump to set agendas, break tie votes, arbitrate disputes over the charter, establish or dissolve subsidiary bodies, delegate Board powers, appoint the commander of Gaza’s International Stabilization Force and ultimately select his successor. Trump also appoints members of the Executive Board, which holds major operational responsibilities involving budgets, financial accounts and disbursements, while its decisions remain subject to the chairman’s direction and control.

Even more unusual is that Trump’s chairmanship is not automatically tied to his presidency. The charter allows him to remain chairman indefinitely unless he resigns or becomes unable to serve, potentially giving Trump authority over an international organization created through a U.N. endorsed Gaza process after he eventually leaves the White House. That structure raises a fundamental governance question: where does the authority of the president of the United States end and the personal authority of Donald Trump begin?

Countries Can Pay $1 Billion for Membership Beyond Three Years

The Board’s membership structure has generated another major controversy. Its charter provides that participating countries generally receive terms lasting no more than three years, subject to renewal by the chairman. However, that three year limitation does not apply to governments contributing more than $1 billion in cash during the organization’s first year.

The arrangement has frequently been described as a billion dollar price for permanent membership, although that characterization requires qualification. Countries are not required to contribute $1 billion simply to join the Board. The financial provision instead allows governments making contributions above that threshold to avoid the normal three year membership limitation. Even with that distinction, the structure creates an unusual relationship between money and institutional influence. Governments capable of contributing enormous sums can secure a more durable position inside an organization expected to oversee billions of dollars in reconstruction activity, while ordinary members remain subject to shorter terms and renewal by the chairman.

For an organization influencing Gaza’s reconstruction, diplomatic priorities and potentially future conflicts elsewhere, the arrangement inevitably raises questions about whether wealthy governments are effectively able to purchase greater institutional permanence.

Palestinians Do Not Control the Institution Overseeing Gaza’s Reconstruction

Another fundamental controversy concerns Palestinian representation. The U.N. endorsed framework provides for a Palestinian technocratic committee to administer Gaza’s day to day civilian government, but broader reconstruction strategy, international financing and security policy remain heavily influenced by the Board of Peace and its leadership. The result is an unusual system in which Palestinians may administer government functions while some of the most consequential decisions involving Gaza’s reconstruction, financing, security architecture and long-term economic development are shaped by an externally controlled institution.

Critics argue that such a structure risks replacing meaningful Palestinian self-determination with internationally supervised administration. Supporters counter that the scale of Gaza’s destruction, the political divisions between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority and the enormous amount of reconstruction capital required make some form of international transitional authority unavoidable. Whatever position one takes on that argument, the imbalance is unmistakable: the people who will live with the consequences of Gaza’s reconstruction do not exercise equivalent control over the institution directing much of that process.

Billions Have Been Pledged While Questions Remain Over Where the Money Is Held

The Board’s financial architecture has produced some of the most serious transparency concerns. More than $17 billion has reportedly been pledged toward Gaza reconstruction through the Board, yet congressional and independent reporting has raised questions about how those funds are being received, controlled and monitored. Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned in June that Congress remained largely in the dark about the organization despite the Trump administration seeking to transfer U.S. taxpayer money to it. According to Shaheen, State Department officials were unable during a congressional briefing to answer basic questions about standard monitoring mechanisms, Board employees and financial oversight procedures.

The State Department did confirm, according to Shaheen, that the Board had not yet established some of the rules and procedures governing oversight, monitoring and employee vetting normally expected before federal money is transferred to an international organization.

Questions have also emerged over donor money reportedly being directed toward a JPMorgan bank account rather than exclusively through the World Bank administered reconstruction fund. Carnegie reported earlier in the year that negotiations were underway to establish a private JPMorgan account accessible by the chairman or designated Executive Board members, while Shaheen later cited public reporting indicating donor funds had gone to a JPMorgan account without independent transparency requirements comparable to conventional international reconstruction mechanisms. Using a commercial bank is not inherently improper. International organizations regularly maintain accounts with private financial institutions. The critical issue is oversight: who controls withdrawals, who audits transactions, which procurement standards govern spending, whether donors and the public can review disbursements and what conflict of interest rules apply to officials participating in financial decisions.

Those questions become particularly important because several influential figures involved with the Board also have extensive private financial relationships across the Middle East.

Jared Kushner’s Private Equity Business Creates Significant Conflict of Interest Questions

Jared Kushner occupies one of the most complicated positions surrounding the reconstruction effort. After leaving the White House following Trump’s first term, Kushner founded Affinity Partners, a private equity firm that attracted billions of dollars from foreign investors, including Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund became an especially important financial backer. Kushner subsequently returned to a central role in Trump’s Middle East diplomacy while maintaining his private-sector business interests. Affinity also became a major shareholder in Phoenix Financial, one of Israel’s largest financial services and insurance companies.

Those relationships do not establish wrongdoing. They do, however, create significant potential conflicts because Kushner is involved in shaping regional diplomatic and reconstruction policy while his investment business maintains substantial financial relationships with governments and companies operating across the same region. Kushner and the Trump administration have rejected suggestions that those relationships improperly influence policy. Kushner has argued publicly that the relationships critics describe as conflicts are instead part of the experience and trust that allowed him and Steve Witkoff to negotiate effectively with governments throughout the Middle East.

That may explain why the relationships are useful diplomatically. It does not eliminate the need for disclosure and conflict of interest safeguards. Any reconstruction program involving Israeli companies, Gulf financing, regional infrastructure or foreign sovereign investment requires transparent recusals, competitive procurement and independent oversight if the public is expected to distinguish diplomacy conducted for Gaza’s benefit from decisions that could simultaneously benefit private investors.

Private Equity Is Embedded Deep Inside the Reconstruction Structure

Private capital is not merely adjacent to the Board of Peace. It is embedded in the reconstruction strategy itself. Major financial figures have participated in planning discussions surrounding Gaza’s economic future, while proposals have emphasized private investment as a mechanism for rebuilding housing, infrastructure, commercial districts and industry. That expertise could prove valuable. Reconstructing Gaza requires enormous amounts of capital, project management and technical expertise that governments and humanitarian organizations alone may struggle to provide.

The problem arises when people with extensive private market relationships participate in designing an economic system that could generate enormous private market opportunities. Gaza’s reconstruction could eventually involve housing, electricity, water, telecommunications, ports, transportation, tourism, logistics and financial services, with individual projects potentially worth billions of dollars. In that environment, disclosure requirements, competitive bidding, recusals, independent audits and transparent procurement systems are not bureaucratic obstacles. They are basic safeguards against corruption and the appearance of self-dealing.

Gaza Has Already Experienced a Controversial Experiment With Privatized Security

The financial controversies surrounding the Board intersect with an equally consequential issue: who will provide security during reconstruction.bThe Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, established during the war as an alternative aid-distribution system, relied on American private security companies, including Safe Reach Solutions and UG Solutions. Those companies became part of an intensely controversial aid system operating amid widespread hunger and enormous civilian displacement.

The contractors were initially tasked with security functions that included operating checkpoints and screening vehicles and people. Company officials described their mission as defensive rather than offensive and said they were not authorized to detain combatants. Nevertheless, the broader aid distribution system became the subject of severe criticism from humanitarian organizations, U.N. experts, journalists and lawmakers following repeated shootings and civilian deaths around distribution sites.

Contractors Faced Allegations Over the Use of Force Around Aid Sites

Witness testimony, whistleblower allegations and media investigations raised accusations that armed personnel and Israeli forces used live ammunition, warning shots and other coercive measures around aid distribution locations as desperate civilians attempted to obtain food. Responsibility for individual deaths remains disputed, and it would be inaccurate to attribute every casualty near Gaza Humanitarian Foundation sites to American contractors. Israeli forces were also operating around the distribution system, and determining who fired specific shots in individual incidents has frequently been difficult.

The controversy nevertheless became serious enough for U.S. lawmakers and U.N. human rights experts to demand information about Safe Reach Solutions, UG Solutions and the rules governing their operations, including training, weapons, licensing, accountability and the circumstances under which deadly force could be used. The larger concern now is whether companies or personnel emerging from that controversial security system could return under reconstruction, border-security or infrastructure contracts associated with the Board of Peace.

Gaza’s Reconstruction Is Already Attracting Extraordinary Private-Profit Proposals

The potential financial stakes became even clearer when The Guardian obtained a proposal submitted to White House officials by U.S. disaster response company Gothams LLC. The proposal reportedly envisioned a seven year exclusive trucking and logistics arrangement associated with Gaza reconstruction and guaranteed returns equivalent to three times the contractor’s capital expenditure. The State Department told the newspaper at the time that no formal Board procurement system had yet been established and that informal conversations or proposals should not be interpreted as approved contracts.

That distinction is essential: the proposal was not evidence that the Board awarded such a contract.

But its existence illustrates the enormous commercial opportunities already forming around Gaza. Reconstruction is not merely a humanitarian project. It is potentially a multibillion dollar market involving logistics, construction, security, energy, housing and infrastructure. Without strict procurement rules, the reconstruction of Gaza could become extraordinarily lucrative for private companies operating within a system whose financial oversight remains under development.

The Private Military Industry Has a Long History of Accountability Problems

More Perfect Union’s investigation places the Gaza security contractors within the broader history of private military companies that expanded dramatically during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Former Blackwater contractor Morgan Lerette told the outlet that security companies can reorganize, create new corporate entities or change names following scandals while experienced personnel continue operating elsewhere in the industry. That broader history matters because privatized security can make accountability considerably more complicated than conventional military operations.

Blackwater became internationally notorious following the 2007 Nisour Square massacre in Baghdad, when company guards killed Iraqi civilians. The company subsequently underwent corporate transformations before parts of the business ultimately became incorporated into other security organizations. That history does not establish that contractors currently seeking Gaza work are equivalent to Blackwater or responsible for comparable misconduct. It demonstrates why transparency surrounding corporate ownership, personnel histories, subcontractors, weapons, rules of engagement and legal accountability becomes essential whenever governments outsource armed security functions. The danger is not private contracting by itself. It is private force operating without sufficient public accountability.

A Draft Proposal Sought Sweeping Immunity for Board Personnel and Contractors

Accountability concerns intensified further after The Guardian obtained a draft Board of Peace resolution proposing extensive legal immunities for personnel operating under the organization. According to the reported draft, protections could extend to Board officials, international personnel, security forces and contractors, potentially restricting arrest, detention or legal proceedings connected to their work in Gaza. Legal experts reviewing the document questioned how civilians could pursue accountability following shootings, accidents, property disputes or other alleged misconduct if the proposed protections were implemented broadly.

The draft also reportedly contemplated the Board receiving public property and facilities in Gaza without charge, raising additional questions about property rights and who would possess the legal authority to transfer those assets. The proposal was a draft, not proof that every provision would ultimately be adopted. International organizations also routinely receive certain legal privileges and immunities necessary to perform official functions, so immunity itself is not evidence of corruption.

The concern is the combination of expansive immunity, concentrated institutional power, billions of dollars in reconstruction spending and the possible use of armed private contractors. When the organization controlling security and reconstruction also possesses significant authority over the legal framework governing its own personnel, genuinely independent oversight becomes indispensable.

The International Criminal Court Adds Another Layer to the Accountability Fight

The immunity debate is unfolding alongside the Trump administration’s broader confrontation with the International Criminal Court. The administration has aggressively challenged ICC actions involving American and Israeli officials and has imposed measures against court personnel, arguing that the institution has improperly asserted jurisdiction over nationals of countries that did not consent to its authority.

Critics contend that weakening international judicial oversight while simultaneously constructing a powerful Gaza authority with substantial legal protections could create an accountability gap. Administration officials and supporters counter that the ICC has exceeded its legitimate authority and that international personnel require protection from politically motivated prosecutions.

Those are distinct legal disputes, but together they create a straightforward question about Gaza’s future: if serious misconduct occurs under the reconstruction authority, which genuinely independent institution will have the authority and practical ability to investigate it?

Calling the Entire Operation Proven “Corruption” Goes Beyond the Evidence

The More Perfect Union investigation raises substantial and legitimate questions, but the strongest version of its conclusion requires journalistic caution. The available evidence demonstrates extraordinary concentration of authority in Trump, a billion dollar financial incentive tied to extended membership, limited Palestinian authority over the international institution directing reconstruction, unresolved questions surrounding financial oversight, extensive private business relationships among influential participants, controversial security contractors and proposals for sweeping legal immunity.

Those facts warrant aggressive scrutiny. They do not, standing alone, prove criminal corruption. There is an important difference between demonstrating a system highly vulnerable to conflicts of interest and proving that a particular official accepted a bribe, stole reconstruction money, manipulated a contract or exchanged an official decision for personal financial benefit. That distinction does not weaken the story. It makes the underlying problem clearer: the concern is that billions of dollars could move through an institution whose governance and transparency mechanisms have not kept pace with the extraordinary authority it has accumulated.

Gaza’s Reconstruction Could Become One of the World’s Largest Economic Projects

The scale of the reconstruction makes these governance questions impossible to dismiss. Rebuilding Gaza is expected to cost more than $70 billion over approximately a decade after enormous destruction to homes, hospitals, schools, roads, utilities, businesses and other infrastructure.

Whoever establishes the reconstruction framework will therefore exercise substantial influence over an economic project comparable to rebuilding a small country. Contracts could be worth billions of dollars. Infrastructure concessions could last decades. Land-use decisions could create enormous winners and losers. Security agreements could generate years of recurring revenue, while housing, transportation, logistics and commercial development could fundamentally reshape Gaza’s geography and economy.

That means conflicts of interest are not peripheral ethical concerns. They go directly to whether Palestinians, donor governments and taxpayers can trust the reconstruction process.

The Board of Peace’s Biggest Vulnerability May Be the System It Created

The controversy surrounding Trump’s Board of Peace ultimately extends beyond any single bank account, private-equity investment, contractor or government official. It concerns the architecture of the institution itself. The organization combines extraordinary political authority, billions of dollars in prospective reconstruction funding, private sector financiers, foreign governments, sovereign wealth, security contractors and a chairman whose authority can extend beyond his presidency. At the same time, Palestinians themselves exercise substantially less power over the international institution responsible for shaping the reconstruction of the territory in which they live.

Some of the people participating in that process also maintain private financial relationships connected to governments and businesses operating throughout the same region. None of that automatically establishes corruption, but it creates precisely the environment in which independent audits, transparent procurement, public financial reporting, enforceable conflict of interest rules, meaningful Palestinian representation and outside legal accountability become essential.

Gaza has already suffered catastrophic destruction and an enormous civilian death toll. Rebuilding it will require tens of billions of dollars and years of international involvement. The people living there will bear the consequences of decisions involving land, housing, infrastructure, security and governance long after many of the foreign officials, contractors and investors making those decisions have moved on.

The central question surrounding the Board of Peace is therefore becoming larger than whether it can raise enough money to rebuild Gaza. It is whether an institution structured around concentrated political authority, private capital and overlapping financial interests can demonstrate that Gaza is being rebuilt transparently for the people who live there rather than becoming one of the largest and least accountable reconstruction markets of the modern era.

Sources

More Perfect Union — We Investigated the Board of Peace

More Perfect Union — Interview With Former Blackwater Contractor Morgan Lerette

U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee — Board of Peace Oversight and Taxpayer Funding Questions

Carnegie Endowment — The Board of Peace and Funding for Gaza Reconstruction

Carnegie Endowment — The Board of Peace Plan for Gaza

Reuters — Board Charter and $1 Billion Extended Membership Provision

CBS News — Board of Peace Charter, Membership and Gaza Mandate

The Guardian — Draft Board of Peace Legal Immunity Proposal

The Guardian — Gaza Contractor Proposal Sought Seven-Year Exclusivity and 300% Returns

The Washington Post — UG Solutions and Safe Reach Solutions Operations in Gaza

The Washington Post — Kushner, Witkoff and Conflict-of-Interest Questions