U.S. Approves $24.3 Billion F-35 Sale to Saudi Arabia, Raising New Questions Over Israel’s Military Edge and China’s Access to American Stealth Technology

U.S. Approves $24.3 Billion F-35 Sale to Saudi Arabia, Reshaping Middle East Air Power as China and Israel Questions Loom

WASHINGTON — The Trump administration has cleared the way for one of the most consequential U.S. arms sales to the Middle East in years, approving a potential $24.3 billion package that would put 48 F-35 stealth fighters in Saudi Arabia’s arsenal and end Israel’s status as the only Middle Eastern country operating the advanced American warplane.

The U.S. State Department approved the proposed Foreign Military Sale on September 17, covering 48 conventional takeoff and landing F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters, 49 Pratt & Whitney F135 engines, including one spare, and an extensive package of secure communications, cryptographic equipment, electronic warfare support, software, simulators, training, maintenance and logistics. The sale still faces the U.S. arms transfer process, including congressional oversight, and would take years to translate into an operational Saudi F-35 fleet.

The State Department says the proposed sale would strengthen the security of Saudi Arabia, improve interoperability with U.S. and allied forces and help Riyadh deter current and future threats. Washington’s formal notification also states that the transaction would not alter the basic military balance in the region, an assessment likely to receive considerable scrutiny because the deal touches three of Washington’s most sensitive Middle Eastern security issues at once: Israel’s legally protected qualitative military edge, Saudi Arabia’s expanding relationship with China and the broader transformation of U.S. Saudi relations after decades of disputes over terrorism, human rights and regional policy.

Saudi Arabia Would Join an Extremely Exclusive F-35 Club

The F-35 is considerably more than a conventional fighter aircraft. Its military value comes from the combination of low observable stealth characteristics, advanced sensors, electronic warfare capabilities, data sharing and sensor fusion that allows the aircraft to collect information from multiple sources and present pilots with an integrated picture of the battlefield. That makes access to the aircraft, and the technology surrounding it, one of Washington’s most closely controlled defense exports.

If the Saudi sale is completed, Riyadh would become the only Arab government operating the F-35 and the second Middle Eastern operator after Israel. The Saudi request dates to 2025, while President Donald Trump publicly backed selling the aircraft to Riyadh around Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s November 2025 visit to Washington.

The deal also sits inside a much larger expansion of U.S. Saudi defense cooperation. During Trump’s 2025 visit to Saudi Arabia, Washington announced a defense package valued at nearly $142 billion, while the relationship subsequently expanded through additional security arrangements. The F-35 would take that relationship significantly further because Washington would not simply be selling Saudi Arabia another generation of fighter aircraft; it would be giving Riyadh access to one of the most technologically sensitive weapons platforms in the American inventory.

The Deal Raises an Unavoidable Question for Israel

Israel has historically occupied a unique position in American Middle East defense policy and is currently the region’s only F-35 operator, flying a customized version known as the F-35I Adir. The proposed Saudi sale does not automatically eliminate Israel’s military advantage, but it would introduce an advanced capability into another regional air force that Israel previously possessed exclusively.

That matters because maintaining Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge, or QME, is not simply a diplomatic tradition. Congress codified the policy into U.S. law, requiring the executive branch to evaluate certain proposed arms sales to Middle Eastern governments in relation to Israel’s ability to counter credible conventional military threats through superior military capabilities.

The State Department maintains that the Saudi F-35 sale would not alter the regional military balance. Israel’s overall qualitative advantage, however, depends on considerably more than whether another government possesses the same basic aircraft. Aircraft configuration, weapons, software, electronic-warfare capabilities, training, intelligence integration, fleet size and access to future upgrades can all affect the real world balance of power.

Israel has not mounted the kind of categorical public opposition associated with some previous advanced U.S. weapons transfers, but Israeli officials previously sought to link Saudi access to the F-35 with Riyadh establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. The transaction now moving forward demonstrates that Washington is willing to advance the fighter sale without first securing Saudi entry into the Abraham Accords.

The F-35 Was Once Potential Leverage for Saudi-Israel Normalization

That distinction could prove geopolitically significant. For years, access to advanced American weapons and deeper U.S. security guarantees formed part of a broader diplomatic discussion surrounding potential Saudi normalization with Israel. Riyadh had been viewed as the ultimate prize in an expansion of the Abraham Accords, which normalized Israel’s relations with several Arab governments during Trump’s first administration.

The diplomatic landscape changed dramatically following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Gaza war. Saudi officials increasingly linked normalization to progress on the Palestinian issue, while Washington continued negotiating separately with Riyadh over security cooperation, nuclear technology and defense arrangements.

By the time Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited Washington in November 2025, Saudi Arabia had secured substantially deeper American security cooperation and a U.S. commitment to move toward an F-35 sale without first normalizing relations with Israel. The result represents a meaningful shift in leverage: one of the most valuable military incentives Washington could potentially have used in normalization negotiations is now advancing separately from those talks.

China May Be Washington’s Bigger Long Term Problem

Israel is only one side of the security debate. The other is China, whose expanding economic, technological and security relationships with Saudi Arabia create a potentially serious counterintelligence problem for Washington.

U.S. officials and intelligence assessments have raised concerns that Beijing could attempt to gain access to sensitive F-35 technology through espionage or through Saudi Arabia’s growing relationships with Chinese companies and security institutions. Concerns have included Chinese technology within Saudi telecommunications infrastructure and the broader question of whether the enormous technological ecosystem surrounding the F-35 could be adequately isolated from potential foreign intelligence collection.

The concern is not that Saudi Arabia would simply hand an F-35 to Beijing. The security problem is considerably more complicated because fifth-generation aircraft operate inside enormous technological ecosystems involving mission software, electronic-warfare libraries, communications systems, maintenance infrastructure, cryptographic equipment, sensors and classified operational data. Even partial access to those systems could potentially provide a sophisticated foreign intelligence service with valuable information about how the aircraft detects threats, communicates, conceals its signature and operates in combat.

China has spent heavily developing its own fifth-generation aircraft, including the Chengdu J-20, making American stealth technology, sensor architecture, electronic signatures and operational systems obvious intelligence targets. Protecting the F-35 therefore involves more than guarding aircraft parked on an air base; it requires securing networks, maintenance facilities, software, communications infrastructure, personnel and the enormous amount of operational information generated by the aircraft.

Washington has previously demonstrated how seriously it takes those risks. Turkey was removed from the F-35 program after acquiring Russia’s S-400 air-defense system because U.S. officials feared that operating the Russian system alongside the F-35 could expose sensitive information about the aircraft. Saudi Arabia therefore presents Washington with a similar strategic balancing act in a different form: bringing one of the Middle East’s most powerful governments deeper into the American defense ecosystem while preventing Riyadh’s relationships with China from creating a pathway into some of America’s most sensitive military technology.

The Deal Comes With Decades of Political Baggage

Any major U.S. Saudi agreement also carries historical weight that extends well beyond fighter aircraft. Fifteen of the 19 al-Qaeda hijackers responsible for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were Saudi nationals, creating decades of scrutiny around the relationship between Washington and Riyadh. The 9/11 Commission did not conclude that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials funded al-Qaeda, but subsequent FBI investigations examined connections between individuals associated with Saudi institutions and people who interacted with hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar after they arrived in Southern California.

Declassified FBI material released years later documented investigative scrutiny of those networks, leaving a complicated evidentiary record that has continued to fuel litigation and political controversy without establishing that the Saudi government directed the September 11 attacks. That distinction is critical when discussing one of the most contentious chapters in U.S.-Saudi relations.

The murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi created another major rupture. Khashoggi was killed inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018, and a declassified U.S. intelligence assessment released in 2021 concluded that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman approved an operation to capture or kill him, citing the crown prince’s control over Saudi security organizations and the participation of members of his protective detail. Saudi authorities have rejected accusations that Mohammed bin Salman ordered the killing.

Those controversies have repeatedly fueled congressional opposition to weapons transfers and closer strategic ties with Riyadh, and they provide important context as lawmakers consider another major transaction involving one of the most advanced weapons systems the United States possesses.

Why Washington Is Willing to Take the Risk

The administration’s case for the sale is fundamentally strategic. Saudi Arabia remains one of the most important military and economic powers in the Gulf, sits beside some of the world’s most critical energy and shipping infrastructure and has faced direct threats from Iran and Iran-aligned forces. The kingdom is also actively diversifying its international partnerships rather than depending exclusively on Washington, creating competition between the United States and China for long term influence in Riyadh.

From the American perspective, supplying the F-35 could bind Saudi Arabia more tightly to U.S. military infrastructure for decades. Advanced fighter aircraft require enormous long-term ecosystems of American parts, software, upgrades, training, maintenance and technical support, meaning the initial aircraft purchase represents the beginning of the strategic relationship rather than the end of it. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, would gain something it has sought for years: entry into the highest tier of American combat aviation technology.

That helps explain why the transaction matters far beyond its $24.3 billion price tag. The deal is simultaneously an arms sale, an alliance-management decision, a response to Chinese influence in the Gulf and a major test of how Washington intends to balance increasingly close relations with Saudi Arabia against its longstanding commitment to Israel.

A Fighter Jet Sale That Could Reshape the Middle East

The proposed sale reflects a broader transformation underway across the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is strengthening its military capabilities and diversifying its international relationships, Israel is attempting to preserve a technological advantage that Washington has committed by law to protect, China is expanding its economic and security footprint throughout the Gulf, and the United States is trying to prevent Beijing from displacing American influence in one of the world’s most strategically important regions.

The F-35 now sits directly in the middle of those competing interests. For Washington, the potential payoff is a Saudi Arabia more deeply embedded in the American defense architecture; for Riyadh, it is access to a class of combat aircraft previously unavailable to any Arab government; for Israel, it creates a new test of how Washington defines and protects its qualitative military edge; and for U.S. intelligence agencies, it creates a long-term counterintelligence challenge centered on preventing China from gaining access to sensitive technology.

The State Department’s position is that the sale would not alter the basic regional military balance, but the ultimate consequences will depend on considerably more than the number of aircraft being sold. Configuration, weapons access, software restrictions, training, delivery schedules, intelligence integration, Israel’s future capabilities, Saudi China relations and the evolution of regional alliances will determine how consequential the transaction ultimately becomes.

What is already clear is that Washington is prepared to move one of its most advanced military technologies into Saudi hands despite unresolved questions involving Israel, China and the kingdom’s complicated history with the United States. The $24.3 billion price tag may ultimately be the easiest part of the deal to calculate.

Sources & Further Reading

U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency — Saudi Arabia Major Arms Sales
DSCA Major Arms Sales Notifications

U.S. Department of State — U.S. Security Cooperation With Saudi Arabia
State Department: U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation

Congressional Research Service — Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and U.S. Arms Sales
Congressional Research Service QME Report

FBI — September 11 Investigation
FBI: 9/11 Investigation

FBI Vault — Declassified September 11 Investigative Records
FBI Vault: 9/11 Materials

Office of the Director of National Intelligence — Assessment of the Saudi Government’s Role in Jamal Khashoggi’s Killing
ODNI Khashoggi Intelligence Assessment

Lockheed Martin — F-35 Lightning II Program
F-35 Lightning II Overview

U.S. Department of Defense — Turkey’s Removal From the F-35 Program
Defense Department: Turkey and the F-35 Program